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The Bill of Rights after September 11th: Principles or
Pragmatism?
Christopher E. Smith '
I. INTRODUCTION
The first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, known gen-
erally as the Bill of Rights, have iconic status as the laws that
"protect the people from the government, which is why the fram-
ers tacked [them] on to the Constitution."' Initially, the Bill of
Rights was "adopted to protect the citizens of the states from the
mischief and excesses of the new federal government." The Su-
preme Court's decisions incorporating most of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights for application against state and local governments
broadened these amendments' protective powers to safeguard in-
dividuals against all American governmental officials, agencies,
and institutions.3 For American law and government, the first ten
amendments have monumental importance because "the Bill of
Rights codifies rights that are fundamental to a liberal-democratic
polity and stipulates limits on governmental authority." In other
words, contrary to the arguments of Alexander Hamilton and
other early Federalists,' the Bill of Rights has come to be viewed
* Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1980; M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.), 1981; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1984;
Ph.D., University of Connecticut, 1988.
1. Roger Rosenblatt, The Bill of Rights: The First 10 Amendment Launches Us On a
Journey of Self-Discovery, LIFE, Fall 1991, at 9.
2. JOHN C. DOMINO, CIVIL RIGHTS & LIBERTIES: TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (1994).
3. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2 (1986) ("[Tlhe Court has haltingly reached much
the same result by gradual incorporation of most rights in the Bill of Rights as limits on the
states under the due process clause, a development that reached fruition in the 1960s.").
4. DOMINO, supra note 2, at 3.
5. In THE FEDERALIST No. 84, Hamilton argued:
I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which
they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but
would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not
granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more
than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
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by Americans as an essential element for the protection of indi-
viduals' liberty. As characterized by Yale professor, Akhil Reed
Amar, "The Bill of Rights stands as the high temple of our consti-
tutional order-America's Parthenon.. .. 6
The war on terrorism has challenged the traditional rhetoric
and contemporary reality concerning the Bill of Rights. Societal
rules, individual rights, and limits on governmental authority de-
fined by the Bill of Rights changed in the aftermath of events that
occurred on September 11, 2001-at least with respect to specific
individuals. As a response to hijackers' deadly suicide attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Bush administra-
tion, often with congressional support, instituted a variety of
measures that it asserted were necessary to combat the threat of
terrorism.' These measures ranged from military attacks in for-
eign countries8 to creative prosecutorial uses of existing statutes.9
In the course of undertaking these putative anti-terrorist actions,
the Bush Administration has received heavy criticism for allegedly
running roughshod over the principles of the Bill of Rights.'" The
government's strategies appear to be premised on a view of consti-
tutional rights, expressed by Justice Antonin Scalia in a public
speech, that during wartime "the [legal] protections [for individu-
als] will be ratcheted right down to the constitutional minimum.""
In other words, the vital need to protect the country from its ene-
mies during a time of war necessitates a reduction, and perhaps
power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall
not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?
THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), quoted in ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE
BIRTH OF THE BIL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791 185 (1962).
6. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS xi (1998).
7. See Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the Sept. 12 Era, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 10, 2003, at 66 (book excerpt describing actions by Attorney General John Ashcroft in
asserting governmental powers to combat terrorism).
8. See James Webb, The War in Iraq Turns Ugly. That's What Wars Do., N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2003, available at www.nytimes.com/2003/03/30/weekinreview/ (discussion of
difficulties involved in the military invasion of Iraq by the United States).
9. See Eric Lichtblau, Statute Becomes Justice Department's Weapon of Choice, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, available at www.nytimes.com/2003/04/06/international/worldspecial/
(discussion of the use by the U.S. Justice Department of statutes that permit prosecution of
people who lend "material support" to any group designated by the United States as a "ter-
rorist organization").
10. See Anthony D. Romero, How the War on Terrorism Affects You, CIL LIBERTIES
(The American Civil Liberties Union National Newsletter) 1 (Fall 2002) (criticisms of the
federal government's anti-terrorism tactics that have allegedly violated constitutional
rights, generated excessive governmental secrecy, and encouraged racial and religious
profiling).
11. Justice Scalia Says War Warrants Rights' Recess, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 19, 2003,
available at www.sacbee.com/24hour/nation/story/814367p-5777643c.html.
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even a severe reduction, in the recognition of constitutional rights
provided by the Bill of Rights.
Under the traditional rhetoric about the Bill of Rights and its
importance for the maintenance of individual liberty and a democ-
ratic society,12 the document and its individual provisions are por-
trayed as embodying principles that must be respected and pre-
served in order to prevent the risk of excessive governmental
power. By contrast, the assertion that rights can shrink and per-
haps even disappear during a war or other emergency portrays a
pragmatic view of rights that characterizes them, in some sense,
as luxuries that must be set aside during certain historical eras.
This article will examine these competing perspectives on the Bill
of Rights to examine their implications for contemporary law and
public policy.'3
II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS: IDENTIFYING PRINCIPLES
The story of the Bill of Rights begins literally at the creation of
the United States Constitution.14 Although there are older Eng-
lish roots for some of the rights described in the Bill of Rights, the
actual definition and implementation of those rights developed
over the course of American history. As described by Charles
Rembar,
Due process of law, our courts have told us, is a legacy of
Magna Carta, the fundamental common law, the Natural
Law, the ancient rights of Englishmen, the timeless features
of our legal system. We have seen that the rights we have
been speaking of [in the Bill of Rights] are considerably less
than timeless; that if they are fundamental, the courts have
only recently made them so .... "
12. See DOMINO, supra note 2, at 3 ("Thus, the Bill of Rights codifies rights that are
fundamental to a liberal-democratic polity and stipulates constitutional limits on govern-
ment authority.").
13. When this article discusses the Bill of Rights, it also intends to include considera-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment which, although not actually part of the Bill of Rights,
makes the rights in the first ten amendments applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause. See THOMAS R. HENSLEY, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE
CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 92-125 (1997).
14. See, e.g., RUTLAND, supra note 5, 130-62 (description of how the Bill of Rights arose
from debates about the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution).
15. CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
388 (1980).
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Indeed, Yale's Professor Amar notes that the Bill of Rights had
relatively little specific meaning and impact in the minds and
hands of its authors, so that the visionaries who authored the
Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War really deserve credit
for effectuating the promise of rights for American citizens. 6 In
light of this recognition that the legal protections embodied in the
words of the Bill of Rights do not really reflect centuries-old prin-
ciples and practices, it would be deceptive to compare post-
September 11th treatment of the Bill of Rights with illusory his-
torical images. Instead, an accurate comparison must begin with
the actual principles of the Bill of Rights as enunciated through
the Supreme Court's decisions defining rights and proceed to com-
pare those enunciated principles with the evident pragmatism of
the contemporary war-on-terrorism diminution of legal protections
for individuals. 7
A. Supreme Court Cases and the Meaning of the Bill of Rights
Individual provisions of the Bill of Rights lack inherent meaning
and must be given definition through interpretations of the U.S.
Supreme Court and other courts. 8 The phrase "cruel and unusual
punishments" in the Eighth Amendment, 9 for example, does not
give any indication by its words about which punishments fall
within its ambit as improper to apply against criminal offenders.
Professors Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin have said that the
"broad language of the cruel and unusual punishments clause
must be seen as a grant of jurisdiction .... [I]t could be under-
stood only as a jurisdictional provision that invited the courts to
16. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 290-91, 293.
In the first century of our nation's existence, the Bill of Rights played a surprisingly
trivial role: only once before 1866 was it used by the Supreme Court to invalidate
federal action .... [Tihe central role of the Bill of Rights today owes at least as much
to the Reconstruction as to the Creation .... It was [John] Bingham's generation [in
the Reconstruction Congress] that in effect added a closing parenthesis after the first
eight (or nine, or ten) amendments, distinguishing these amendments from all others
As a result, Americans today can lay claim to a federal 'Bill of Rights' set apart from
everything else, and symbolically first even if textually middling.
Id.
17. There is precedent for a diminution of rights during wartime by recalling, for ex-
ample, the detention without due process applied to Japanese-Americans during World
War II. PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 39-62 (1988). However, the
contemporary "war" against terrorism presents an arguably distinguishable context be-
cause it involves governmental action against shadowy international organizations rather
than sovereign states.
18. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES 36 (2004).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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construct a set of rules, for it provided no meaningful guidance
about the content of these rules." ° Other clauses also contain
vague phrases, such as the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
"unreasonable searches and seizures"2' and the Sixth Amend-
ment's entitlement to a "speedy trial."2 The words "unreasonable"
and "speedy" do not have any specific meaning until that meaning
is supplied by judges' interpretations of those words in the context
of legal cases."
Because judicial interpretation shapes the meaning of the Bill of
Rights, the nature of legal protections for individuals will change
as judicial interpretations of various constitutional amendments
change over time. 4 As Professor Lee Epstein and Joseph Kobylka
observed, "[One] basic truth about the nature of the American ver-
sion of constitutional governance [is]: its rules are not static, in-
susceptible to change." 5 There are abundant examples of such
changes through constitutional interpretation, such as the Su-
preme Court's 1968 decision to require state courts to honor the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury for cases involving serious
criminal charges. 6 In expanding the jury right in this manner,
the Court had come a far distance from the observation in Justice
Benjamin Cardozo's 1937 majority opinion that "[t]he right to trial
by jury... ha[s] value and importance[, but] ... [flew would be so
narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened
system of justice would be impossible without [it]."27 Thus, when
we speak of the Bill of Rights, we must necessarily recognize that
we are not discussing a set of fixed principles. Instead, we must
acknowledge that the legal protections provided for individuals by
the United States Constitution have changed throughout Ameri-
can history.
20. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE 206 (1998).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23. Judges are generally barred from issuing advisory opinions. See STEPHEN L.
WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 174-75 (4th ed. 1993).
Therefore, their interpretations of constitutional provisions are inevitably shaped by the
factual contexts in which legal issues arise and arguments presented by lawyers in specific
cases. See LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT & LEGAL CHANGE:
ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 302 (1992).
24. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 80 (1992) ("The
meaning of the Constitution changes as justices interpret its words in conjunction with
historical, social, and political developments in American society.").
25. EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 23, at 300.
26. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
27. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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B. The Principles of the Contemporary Bill of Rights
Although some scholars applaud the process for changing con-
stitutional meanings through judicial interpretation as a means
for keeping the Constitution relevant to the needs of an evolving
society,8 the existence of change makes it more difficult to argue
for the existence of enduring constitutional principles. 29  Despite
the practical need to acknowledge that the Bill of Rights does not
reflect a set of permanent rules for American society, it is still pos-
sible to discern principles flowing from the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the contemporary Bill of Rights. By this I mean that
there are legal principles that are so firmly established and well-
supported by consensus, or near-consensus, on the Supreme Court
that they reflect a contemporary settled doctrine that is thor-
oughly accepted by courts, and, moreover, the basis for an expec-
tation of entitlement by individuals drawn into the justice system.
These expectations about principles concerning rights, created in
large part by the Supreme Court's decisions, are evident in public
opinion polls. ° Any significant change that might affect these ac-
cepted principles about rights through decisions by a future Su-
preme Court would require overt repudiation of a long-standing
promise of protection or entitlement granted to individuals under
well-established interpretations of the Constitution. For example,
when a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit
challenged the constitutional basis for and necessity of Miranda
28. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 31
(1991) ("We do not attempt to offer the last word on the Constitution's meaning; when a
last word is possible, the Constitution will have lost its relevance to an ever-changing soci-
ety.").
29. Advocates of judicial interpretation by original intent argue that judicial interpre-
tations that produce flexible, evolving changes in constitutional meanings are contrary to
the only true set of constitutional principles: fixed meanings determined by the original
intentions of the Constitution's authors. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE
REAL CLARENCE THOMAS: CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY 50-59
(2000). However, the originalists claim of principled decision making has been thoroughly
criticized by various scholars and judges. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V.
THE CONSTITUTION 7-23 (1987).
30. Public opinion polls show strong majority support for the following principles con-
cerning rights: "Right to the government providing a defense lawyer for someone who can-
not afford one," 74%; "Right to remain silent when being questioned by the police," 63%;
"Right to have a lawyer present during police questioning," 71%. GEORGE F. COLE &
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 121 (10th ed. 2004).
It is reasonable to infer that the Supreme Court's famous decisions contributed to these
expectations, both because they relate to two of the Court's most well-known decisions,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
and because the Court's decisions in the 1960s created these rights and brought them into
public consciousness.
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warnings,31 the U.S. Supreme Court emphatically rejected that
view and, in an opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, reit-
erated the strong support for the precedent in Miranda v. Ari-
zona." Although Rehnquist acknowledged that "no constitutional
rule is immutable,"33 he said that Miranda is "a constitutional
rule" 4 that "has become embedded in routine police practice to the
point where the warnings have become part of our national cul-
ture." 5 Such reasoning provides an endorsement that recognizes
the existence of near-consensus support on the Court and well-
established expectations among members of the public.
If we conceive of the contemporary principles of the Bill of
Rights as flowing from those Supreme Court interpretations of the
Constitution that draw consensus, or near-consensus support, and
receive consistent reinforcement in Supreme Court opinions,
which rights affecting criminal justice can be said to be based on
such principles? The following list is not meant to be exhaustive, 6
but is intended to provide reference points for the subsequent dis-
cussion of post-September 1 1 th developments.
3
1
1. The Right to Counsel for Criminal Defendants, Including
Appointed Counsel for Indigent Defendants
In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel for application in serious criminal
31. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
32. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reiterating strong support for the
decision in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436).
33. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
34. Id. at 444.
35. Id. at 443.
36. There are additional rights that may be regarded as principles that are consistently
reinforced by Supreme Court decisions, but some of these rights can be more illusory than
concrete because their implementation depends on discretionary decisions by police officers,
e.g., the requirement of "reasonable suspicion" for a Fourth Amendment stop (People v.
Oliver, 627 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. 2001); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)), or the Su-
preme Court has created exceptions that can apply to multiple situations, e.g., the exclu-
sionary rule (New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
(1984)).
37. It would be possible to discuss other principles from the Bill of Rights that have
become subject to debate as a result of the USA Patriot Act and other measures that in-
crease governmental powers of surveillance over the entire population of the United States
and threats to First Amendment rights, such as freedom of association. See NANCY CHANG,
SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT: How POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES
THREATEN OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES 43-66, 92-137 (2002); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY,
TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 147-75 (2002). However, this article will illustrate its




cases in state courts in the famous case of Gideon v. Wainwright."
A strong near-consensus existed throughout the United States in
support of this principle at the time of the Court's decision. By
1963, nearly all states had already implemented the right to coun-
sel in their own courts through legislation, judicial decisions, or
informal courthouse practices. 9 Thus, in the Gideon decision, "the
Court merely used its powers to make the rest of the states catch
up" with a principle already adopted throughout the rest of the
nation.4 °
After Gideon, the Supreme Court expanded the entitlement to
counsel to additional contexts. The right to counsel applies for
anyone facing the possibility of incarceration," not merely those
facing serious charges that could lead to six months or more of
imprisonment, as in Clarence Gideon's case. The right also ap-
plies to first appeals of right, usually to state intermediate appel-
late courts. 2 In addition, suspects are entitled to representation
by counsel during custodial questioning 3 and at "critical stages" in
the justice process, such as at identification line-ups conducted
after formal charges have been filed. Although the Supreme
Court has declined to expand the right to counsel to several addi-
tional contexts,45 the entitlement to representation remains a con-
sistently supported principle under the Sixth Amendment of the
Bill of Rights. It is also supported by public opinion as 74% of re-
spondents to a national survey labeled as "essential" the right to
have the government provide a defense attorney for someone who
cannot afford one.46
38. 372 U.S. at 335.
39. ANTHONY LEwIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 132-33 (1964).
40. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 256 (2003).
41. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
42. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
43. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
44. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
45. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (no right to counsel when facing minor
charges punishable only by a small fine); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no right to
counsel for discretionary appeals); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no automatic
right to counsel for probation revocation proceedings); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1
(1989) (no right to counsel for habeas corpus proceedings, including those concerning capi-
tal cases).
46. GEORGE F. COLE & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 186 (4th
ed. forthcoming 2004).
266 Vol. 42
2. Right to Be Free From Physical Coercion as Means of
Governmental Extraction of Incriminating Information
During Questioning, Based on the Right to Due Process
and the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Compelled
Self-Incrimination
There is a long history of police officers using violence to obtain
information from suspects in the United States. As described by
legal historian Professor Lawrence Friedman concerning police
practices in the early twentieth century:
Police brutality has a long, dishonorable history, not only on
the street, but also in the station house. Here was the domain
of the "third degree"-various ways of getting information out
of suspects by inflicting "suffering, physical and mental."
This rather bland phrase conceals a whole world of torture
and abuse-beatings with nightsticks and rubber hoses, and
sometimes worse .... [including using a dentist for] drilling
into the pulp chamber of a lower rear molar in the region of a
nerve [to make a suspect talk]."
Public investigations of the police revealed the use of brutal
methods as far back as the Lexow Commission in New York City
in 1894.48 Yet little was done to prevent the abuses that often took
place behind closed doors and were primarily inflicted on people
who lacked the power to complain successfully - the poor, the
49
young, and members of racial minority groups.
The risks from coercive violence are not merely inhumane
treatment and torture. The use of such methods also increases
the likelihood that innocent people will confess to wrongdoing
simply to end the infliction of pain." Thus, the use of such tech-
niques can produce unjust outcomes when people are erroneously
47. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 361(1993).
48. Id. at 154.
49. Id. at 153-54, 362-63.
50. See SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 121.
The problem of abusive police practices remains real in some American cities. In
Prince Georges County, Maryland, police officers questioned a man for twenty-eight
hours without an attorney present before the exhausted man finally confessed to a
murder that he did not commit. DNA evidence later proved that he was innocent of
the crime, and the real killer sexually assaulted seven more victims while the police
kept the wrong man in jail.
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regarded as culpable for deeds that they admitted merely to stop
torturous questioning techniques.51
The U.S. Supreme Court began to assert its authority against
such practices as early as the 1930s, even before it had begun in-
corporating criminal justice-related rights to apply against the
states." The Court's 1936 decision in Brown v. Mississippi con-
cerned police officers' practice of "solving" crimes by torturing Af-
rican-Americans into confessing. 3 In the Brown case:
Upon his denial [of guilt] they seized him, and with the par-
ticipation of the deputy they hanged him by a rope to the limb
of a tree, and having let him down, they hung him again, and
when he was let down the second time, and he still protested
his innocence, he was tied to a tree and whipped, and still de-
clining to accede to the demands that he confess, he was fi-
nally released and he returned with some difficulty to his
home, suffering intense pain and agony .... A day or two
thereafter .... the deputy stopped and severely whipped the
defendant, declaring that he would continue the whipping un-
til he confessed, and the defendant then agreed to confess to
such a statement as the deputy would dictate .... The other
two defendants ... were laid over chairs and their backs were
cut to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it. . .. "
The Supreme Court overturned the defendants' convictions by say-
ing, "It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to
the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of
these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as
the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due
process."55 The Court's statement does not merely mean that the
use of that type of evidence is a violation of constitutional rights;
under contemporary legal standards, the police officers' actions
51. See SMITH, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 40, at 211;
First, an individual is punished unjustly .... In addition to producing injustices,
such erroneous convictions damage the reputation of the courts and cast doubt on the
ability of legal processes to make accurate determinations of guilt. Moreover, the ac-
tual guilty people are still out on the streets where they may continue to threaten the
public with additional crimes."
Id.
52. The incorporation of most rights relating to criminal justice occurred during the
Warren Court era, 1953-1969. Id. at 25.
53. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
54. Id. at 281-82.
55. Id. at 286.
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themselves are clearly in violation of the Constitution and would
make the officers susceptible to civil rights lawsuits for substan-
tial damages.56 In addition, the principle that officials should not
use physical coercion to extract confessions appears to be strongly
supported by the American public. In one poll, 93% of respondents
answered "No" to the question, "Would you approve of a policeman
striking a citizen who was being questioned in a murder case?" 7
Thus, there appears to be a strong consensus against the use of
coercive violence to induce self-incrimination.
3. Right to Probable Cause Determination by a Judicial Of-
ricer to Determine Validity of Arrest and Detention
According to the Fourth Amendment, when police officers seek
an arrest warrant, they must present evidence constituting prob-
able cause to show the likelihood of a suspect's involvement in a
crime in order for a judicial officer to issue a warrant.58 This re-
quirement ensures that a neutral judicial officer examines the
evidence purporting to justify the arrest before an individual is
deprived of his or her liberty in circumstances in which police offi-
cers know in advance that they intend to make an arrest.59
When police officers make arrests without a warrant, such as in
situations in which they observe criminal behavior or a witness
reports the occurrence of a crime, the arrestee is entitled to have
the basis for the arrest examined by a judicial officer in a hear-
ing.6" The hearing to determine probable cause is not a full-blown
adversarial proceeding; instead, "such a hearing may and often
does consist merely of a brief appearance in front of a magistrate
after arrest."61 The- hearing must be held within a "reasonable"
time period after arrest, normally within 48 hours.2 Clearly, the
56. VICTOR E. KAPPELER, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY 59-73 (2nd ed.
1997).
57. COLE & SMITH, supra note 30, at 251.
58. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 89 (4th ed. 2000) ("The Fourth Amendment states
that arrest warrants may only issue upon a showing of probable cause and must identify
with particularity the person to be seized.").
59. See SMITH, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 40, at 79 ("Probable cause determina-
tions are supposed to be made and warrants issued by neutral officials who will not-in
theory-automatically support law enforcement officials' desire to obtain the warrant.
These officials are charged with protecting people's Fourth Amendment rights against
improper intrusions by investigatory officers.").
60. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
61. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 58, at 526.
62. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
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entitlement to a probable cause determination is intended to pre-
vent officials from arresting and detaining individuals indefinitely
without a judicial officer considering whether sufficient evidence
exists to support both the arrest and the continuation of detention
after arrest.63 If it were otherwise, police officers and other gov-
ernment officials could deprive people of their liberty without jus-
tification. Such practices, albeit common in many countries, clash
with the ideas underlying a number of rights in the Bill of Rights,
including the right to due process in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments,' the Fourth Amendment protection against unrea-
sonable seizures," and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on ex-
cessive bail.66 All of those provisions embody the constitutional
objective of preventing arbitrary and discretionary deprivations of
liberty.
The right to a determination of probable cause by a judicial offi-
cer enjoys consensus support among the Supreme Court's justices,
who disagree only about whether such post-arrest hearings must
take place within 24 hours after arrest or whether a slightly
longer period of time is permissible.
4. The "Due Process" Right of Access to the Courts for Indi-
viduals Held in Prisons and Jails
Through decisions spanning more than a half-century, the Su-
preme Court has recognized and enforced what it calls "the fun-
damental constitutional right of access to the courts" for people
held in custody in prisons and jails.8 In Ex Parte Hull, decided in
1941, the Court examined a state prison regulation that required
all "documents, briefs, petitions, motions, habeas corpus proceed-
ings and appeals . . . to be submitted to the institutional welfare
office and . . . the legal investigator to the Parole Board."9 The
regulation, in effect, permitted corrections officials to review and
block petitions that prisoners sought to file in federal court. The
63. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 58, at 524 ("[B]efore a suspect may be de-
tained, some official entity other than a law enforcement officer must make a determina-
tion of probable cause.").
64. Both amendments bar deprivations of "life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
67. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 44.
68. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
69. 312 U.S. 546, 548 (1941).
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Supreme Court invalidated the regulation. In the words of Justice
Frank Murphy's majority opinion:
The regulation is invalid. The considerations that prompted
its formulation are not without merit, but the state and its of-
ficers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to
a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is
properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are
questions for that court alone to determine.7 °
If the Supreme Court had permitted the regulations to stand, the
government would possess the authority to prevent detained indi-
viduals from filing appeals to contest their criminal convictions,
habeas corpus petitions to challenge the basis for their detention,
and civil rights lawsuits to seek remedies for improper conduct by
corrections officials. In effect, detained individuals would be com-
pletely at the mercy of corrections officials without any ability to
use the courts to protect their legal rights and without any ability
to inform the outside world about abusive actions taking place in
corrections institutions.71
The precedent in Ex parte Hull established the foundation for
later decisions that solidified a right of access to the courts." In
particular, a series of later decisions identified specific contours of
that right. First, in Johnson v. Avery, 73 decided in 1969, the Court
held that states could not prevent prisoners from helping each
other prepare court petitions unless the state provides an alterna-
tive means of assistance, otherwise the state could, in effect,
impermissibly "adopt and enforce a rule forbidding illiterate or
poorly educated prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions."74 Next,
in Younger v. Gilmore,75 a per curiam affirmance of a lower court
70. Id. at 549.
71. Prior to the intervention of federal courts into the affairs of corrections institutions
in the mid-twentieth century, jailers and prison wardens could control their institutions
with impunity through the use of coercive violence, even if it led to the injuries and deaths
of detainees and convicted offenders. See BEN M. CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART, APPEAL
To JUSTICE: LITIGATED REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS 14-15 (1989) (description of frequency of
prisoners' deaths from poor conditions and abuse prior). After federal courts intervened
into prisons through their acceptance of prisoners' lawsuits, correctional institutions were
forced to move toward humane conditions and governance by formal rules and regulations.
JAMES B. JACOBS, STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY 206 (1977).
72. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, LAW AND CONTEMPARY CORRECTIONS 76-86 (2000).
73. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
74. Id. at 487.
75. 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
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decision, the Court declared that "[r]easonable access to the courts
[for prisoners] is a constitutional imperative which has been held
to prevail against a variety of state interests."76 Last, in Bounds v.
Smith,7 decided in 1977, the Court held that states must provide
prisoners with law libraries or alternative legal resources in order
to "assure meaningful access to the courts."
7
1
The consensus about this right of access to the courts seems es-
pecially strong because even Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, the two justices who generally oppose the recognition of
constitutional rights for convicted offenders, 79 agree that incarcer-
ated individuals possess a right of access to the courts. Scalia has
written that "the Constitution . . . [requires] that [prisoners] be
able to present their grievances to the courts."0 Thomas reiter-
ated recognition of the right of access:
In the end, I agree that the Constitution affords prisoners
what can be termed a right of access to the courts. That right,
rooted in the Due Process Clause and the principle articulated
in Ex parte Hull, is a right not to be arbitrarily prevented
from lodging a claimed violation of a federal right in the fed-
eral court.s'
Although the four foregoing principles do not purport to repre-
sent all of the rights supported by consensus or near-consensus in
contemporary constitutional law, they reflect principles that have
been consistently upheld and supported in court decisions for
many years. They are also principles that collide with the con-
temporary governmental responses to the threat of terrorism.
76. 319 F.Supp. 105, 109 (N.D.Cal. 1970).
77. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
78. Id. at 830.
79. In reliance on originalism as their theory of constitutional interpretation, Justices
Thomas and Scalia argue that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to correct deficient
and inhumane prison conditions and practices because the framers of the Amendment did
not intend for it to be applied in that manner. Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and
Criminal Punishment: The Emerging Visions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L.
REV. 593, 599-603 (1995). According to a Thomas dissent, joined by Scalia, "primary re-
sponsibility for preventing and punishing [improper] conduct [by corrections officers] rests
not with the Federal Constitution but with the laws and regulations of the various states."
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 360 (1996).
81. Id. at 381 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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III. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO SEPTEMBER 11 T
The federal government's response to September 1 1 1h took many
forms, from reorganizing federal agencies into the new Depart-
ment of Homeland Security 2 to enacting legislation to increase
surveillance and search powers83 to military action against Af-
ghanistan.' One element of this response is the Bush administra-
tion's orientation toward enhancing executive powers aimed at
fighting terrorism at the expense of constitutional rights. The
most extreme illustration of this orientation was Attorney General
John Ashcroft's initial plan to suspend access to habeas corpus for
all Americans so that no one detained by the government would
have the opportunity to challenge that detention in court.85 Ac-
cording to one book on the aftermath of September 1 1th, Ashcroft's
pragmatism about the Bill of Rights led to plans for broad expan-
sions of governmental powers. "[Congressman] Sensenbrenner,
marking up the [proposed bill submitted by Ashcroft] furiously,
was astounded. Ashcroft and his people had written the magna
carta of federal agents, freeing them to wiretap, search, arrest,
and hold almost at will, with little judicial oversight."6
In light of the illustrative principles of the Bill of Rights in the
foregoing section, this section will focus specifically on the treat-
ment of detainees resulting from governmental action rather than
on the constitutional rights implications of the full range of re-
sponses to September 1 1 th.7
A. Foreign Detainees on "Foreign" Soil
American forces' success in overthrowing the Taliban govern-
ment of Afghanistan resulted in the capture of hundreds Afghans
affiliated with the Taliban regime as well as hundreds of foreign
82. COLE & SMITH, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 68-69.
83. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Under a Watchful Eye: Incursions on Personal Privacy, in
THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 128-46 (Richard
C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003).
84. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 196-97.
85. See Brill, supra note 7, at 68 ("Most shocking was that the bill suspended what was
known in the law as habeas corpus-which gave anyone detained on American soil the right
to demand a court hearing to challenge the authority of those holding them.").
86. Id.
87. For example, additional anti-terrorism tactics included expanded governmental
authority to undertake "bugging," electronic surveillance, and secret search warrants. Eric
Lictblau, Aftereffects: Intelligence Operations; Justice Dept. Lists Use of New Power to Fight
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2003, available at
www.nytimes.com/2003/05/21/politics/21PATR.html.
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fighters who had come to Afghanistan to support the regime.88
The U.S. government sent at least 650 of these detainees to a
makeshift prison at the U.S. Navy base at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.89 Other detainees were kept at American military bases in
Afghanistan or sent to cooperating countries where they could be
interrogated using coercive methods that would be labeled as "tor-
ture" by most Americans."
The U.S. government chose to hold these foreign prisoners in
overseas locations and to label them as "unlawful combatants"
rather than "prisoners of war" specifically to prevent them from
successfully claiming entitlement to any legal rights.9' If they
were "prisoners of war," they would be entitled to certain rights
under the Geneva Conventions.92 Through the creation of a new
legal category ("unlawful combatants") for which rights have not
been defined under American or international law, the U.S. gov-
ernment asserted for itself the authority to control their treatment
and fates without the constraints of legal rules.93
The Supreme Court established legal precedents for freeing
American officials from the requirements of the Bill of Rights in
their treatment of people on foreign soil. In United States v. Ver-
dugo-Urquidez, agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Admini-
stration joined with Mexican police in conducting warrantless
searches of homes in Mexico owned by a Mexican citizen who had
been arrested and turned over to American officials a few days
earlier.94 A Fourth Amendment challenge to the searches was re-
jected by the Supreme Court, which declared that such rights are
reserved for the "class of persons who are part of [our] national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
with this country to be considered part of that community."95 Such
doctrines enabled the U.S. government to assert that their treat-
88. Joseph Lelyveld, "The Least Worst Place": Life in Guantanamo, in THE WAR ON OUR
FREEDOMS: CIvIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 101-02 (Richard C. Leone & Greg
Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003).
89. Id.
90. See Eyal Press, Tortured Logic, 29 AMNESTY Now 20-23 (Summer 2003) ("A former
CIA official told Newsday about one detainee transferred from Guantanamo Bay to Egypt:
'They promptly tore his fingernails out, and he started telling things.'").
91. See Neil A. Lewis, Tribunals Nearly Ready for Afghanistan Prisoners, N.Y.TIMES,
April 8, 2003, available at www.nytimes.com.
92. Lelyveld, surpa note 88, at 100-03.
93. Id.
94. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
95. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 260.
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ment of post-September 1 1th detainees was beyond the reach of
American law.
One of the most controversial aspects of American treatment of
Taliban detainees and terrorism suspects is the use of coercive
interrogation methods. Those in American custody in Afghanistan
and elsewhere are "held in awkward, painful positions and de-
prived of sleep with a 24-hour bombardment of lights."96 Accord-
ing to Americans who have witnessed interrogations, "alleged ter-
rorists are commonly blindfolded and thrown into walls, bound in
painful positions, subjected to loud noises and deprived of sleep."97
American officials have conceded that "our guys may kick them
around a little bit."98 According to Amnesty International, "[a]t
least two prisoners have been killed in U.S. custody ... In March,
the story broke that death certificates for two Al Qaeda suspects
at the Bagram base in Afghanistan showed both to have been
killed by "blunt force injuries" . . . A military doctor listed the
deaths as homicides."99 An unnamed U.S. official was quoted in
the national news media as saying, "There's a reason why [a spe-
cific Al Qaeda suspect] isn't going to be near a place where he has
Miranda rights or the equivalent. You go to some other country
that'll let us pistol-whip this guy." 1°°
In addition to its own coercive interrogation practices, the U.S.
government transfers some suspects into the custody of allied na-
tions whose intelligence services are known to have used torture
as a means to obtain information from detainees." ' At least one
suspect was sent to Syria where, according to a report from the
U.S. State Department, officials employ torture methods that in-
clude pulling out fingernails and "using a chair that bends back-
wards to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the spine."' Other
suspects have been transferred to Egypt where, according to the
U.S. State Department, the people in custody of intelligence ser-
vices are "suspended from the ceiling or doorframe with feet just
96. See Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogation,
WASH. POST, December 26, 2002, at Al. See also Don Van Natta, Jr., Questioning Terror
Suspects in a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2003, available at
www.nytimes.com/2003/03/09/international/09DETA.html (description of interrogation
techniques employed by United States and allies).
97. Priest & Gellman, supra note 96.
98. Id.
99. Press, supra note 90, at 21.
100. Id. at 22.
101. Priest and Gellman, supra note 96.
102. Press, supra note 90, at 22.
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touching the floor; beaten with fists, whips, metal rods, or other
objects; [and] subjected to electric shocks.""3 Others have been
transferred to Jordan where "frequently alleged methods" of inter-
rogation have included "beating the soles of the feet [and] pro-
longed suspension with ropes in contorted positions."0 4
B. U.S. Citizens Detained on American Soil
At least two U.S. citizens are under indefinite detention in
American military jails without being granted the constitutional
rights due to criminal suspects under the Bill of Rights. The gov-
ernment created the label "enemy combatant" to use for American
terrorism detainees whom they wish to hold without granting any
of the usual rights under the Bill of Rights.0 5
Yaser Esam Hamdi was taken into custody in Afghanistan
where he was allegedly fighting for the Taliban. °6 After he was
taken to the U.S. Navy base in Cuba, it was discovered that he
was a U.S. citizen by virtue of being born in Louisiana when his
father, a Saudi Arabian citizen, was working for an American
company.0 7 He was subsequently transferred to solitary confine-
ment at a military jail in Virginia and denied access to an attorney
or to any court proceedings.' After several proceedings filed in
federal court by Hamdi's father, a federal public defender, and
dozens of law professors, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Cir-
cuit rejected various challenges to Hamdi's status as an "enemy
combatant" and attendant indefinite, incommunicado detention at
a military facility.0 9 The Court concluded that:
[B]ecause it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone
of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict, we hold that
the submitted declaration [of factual allegations submitted by
government] is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that
the Commander in Chief has constitutionally detained Hamdi
103. Id.
104. Priest and Gellman, supra note 96.
105. SMITH, CONSTITUTIoNAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 201-02.




109. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278
(4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
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pursuant to the war powers entrusted to him by the United
States Constitution. 1°
Under the court's decision, the government was not required to
present contestable evidence in a courtroom proceeding and
Hamdi was not permitted to enjoy any rights under the Bill of
Rights.
In May 2002, federal agents arrested Abdullah al-Muhajir, a 31-
year-old former gang member from Chicago, who had changed his
name from Jose Padilla after he converted to Islam."' The federal
government asserted that al-Muhajir planned to build a "dirty
bomb" containing radioactive materials to use in a terrorist attack
within the United States."2 Al-Muhajir was arrested in the
United States and initially held in New York City where he met
with a defense attorney.1 13 However, before charging him with any
crimes, the government labeled him as an "enemy combatant" and
sent him to a military jail in South Carolina where he is held in
isolation without any contact with his attorney or any court pro-
ceedings to present evidence against him."' At the time that his
arrest was announced, American intelligence sources indicated to
news media outlets that the government may not have possessed
enough evidence to bring criminal charges against al-Mujahir
without risking the revelation of sensitive intelligence informa-
tion." 5 Thus, it was easier for the government to lock him away
definitely in military custody rather than go through the formal
processes of criminal court. The federal government has resisted a
district judge's orders requiring that al-Mujahir be given the op-
portunity to meet with his attorney."6
The government expanded this treatment to a non-citizen on
American soil, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who faced criminal
charges for allegedly conspiring with terrorist organizations."7
One month before his scheduled trial, the government decided to
end the criminal prosecution and declare al-Marri to be an "enemy
110. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 459.
111. James Risen & Philip Shenon, U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive






116. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F.Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
117. Eric Lichtblau, Enemy Combatant Decision Marks Change, Officials Say, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2003, available at www.nytimes.com/2003/06/25/politics/25TERR.html.
Winter 2004 277Bill of Rights
Duquesne Law Review
combatant" who would lose his rights and be placed in a military
jail.1 8 Critics viewed the government's action as expanding the
threat of rights deprivations and indefinite detention as the
means to preempt criminal proceedings in which terrorism sus-
pects would have otherwise possessed constitutional rights."9 The
news media carried reports that the six men of Yemeni origin in
Lackawanna, New York,' who pleaded guilty to terrorism-related
charges, were pressured to plead after prosecutors confronted
them with a terrible choice: either admit guilt and accept a prison
term for criminal charges or be labeled as an "enemy combatant"
and be locked away without rights, potentially forever.12' In effect,
the threat of "enemy combatant" status may be the ultimate coer-
cive threat, especially if it is used as a means of gaining guilty
pleas and confessions from people who fear disappearing forever,
potentially never to be heard from again, in a military jail. Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said that "enemy combat-
ants" will not be released until the "war" on terrorism is over.
However, there is no reason to believe that the "war" will ever be
over as various groups and individuals around the world will con-
tinue to plot against the United States for various reasons.'
Apparently, the Justice Department has made plans for the pos-
sible expansion of the use of the "enemy combatant" label by de-
taining other Americans whom they deem to be threatening and
disloyal. As described by Professor Jonathan Turley,
Attorney General John Ashcroft's announced desire for camps
for U.S. citizens he deems to be "enemy combatants" has
moved him from merely being a political embarrassment to
being a constitutional menace. Ashcroft's plan, disclosed last
week but little publicized, would allow him to order the in-
definite incarceration of U.S. citizens and summarily strip
them of their constitutional rights and access to the courts by
declaring them enemy combatants .... [A]ides have indi-
cated that a "high-level" committee will recommend which
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, Where the Trail Led: Between Evidence and
Suspicion; Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, October 12,
2003, available at www.nytimes.com/2003/10/12/nyregion/12LACK.html.
121. Shuffled Off in Buffalo, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, April 7, 2003, at 10.
122. Miles Harvey, The Bad Guy, MOTHER JONES, March/April 2003, at 32, 35.
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citizens are to be stripped of their constitutional rights and
sent to Ashcroft's new camps."'
Clearly, the strategy of using labels that will remove suspects
from the protection of law is attractive to the federal government.
When a federal district judge ruled that Zacarias Moussaoui, who
is accused of participating in the September 11th attacks, must be
able to obtain potentially exculpatory information from an impor-
tant al Qaeda leader held by American officials overseas, the gov-
ernment claimed that any questioning would threaten intelligence
gathering and national security.124 The Bill of Rights is potentially
inconvenient for prosecutors because it requires that they follow
certain procedures and respect specific rights when they pursue a
criminal prosecution. In the Moussaoui case, the government is
reportedly considering transferring him to the Navy base prison in
Cuba to join the foreign "unlawful combatants," who enjoy no en-
forceable rights and who may eventually face trials and possible
executions through military tribunal procedures.'25
fV. THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN A POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH WORLD
As described in the foregoing section, contemporary governmen-
tal responses to the threat of terrorism collide directly with the
principles of the Bill of Rights that have enjoyed broad, consistent
support for the preceding forty years or longer.
A. Right to Counsel and Protection Against Compelled Self
Incrimination
Foreign detainees in Cuba and American "enemy combatants"
held at military jails in the United States have been denied access
to and representation by attorneys. The purpose of defense attor-
neys in the American legal system is to protect the suspect's con-
stitutional rights, contest the evidence presented against the sus-
pect by the government, and advocate on behalf of the suspect in
the context of the legal system's technical rules and arcane proce-
123. Jonathan Turley, Detaining Liberty, LANSING ST. J., August 18, 2002, at 1lA.
124. Philip Shenon, Moussaoui Case May Have to Shift From U.S. Court to Tribunal,
N.Y. TIMES, February 7, 2003, available at
www.nytimes.com/2003/02/07/politics/07TERR.html.
125. Id.; Philip Shenon, Setback for the Government in Bid for 9/11 Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 2003, available at www.nytimes.com/2003/06/03/politics/03SUSP.html.
Winter 2004 Bill of Rights 279
Duquesne Law Review
dures.26 In sum, "[i]f individuals do not have professional repre-
sentation in the criminal justice process, they are at a significant
disadvantage and they are unlikely to be able to fulfill the adver-
sary system's ideal of revealing the truth through the clash of
skilled advocates."'27 Thus, the detainees held on suspicion of ter-
rorist activities have little hope of being protected against coercive
techniques of self-incrimination, for which the right to counsel as-
pect of Miranda rights was created.1 28  They also have no hope of
utilizing judicial processes (if they had access to such processes) in
order to contest evidence against them or to vindicate rights under
the Bill of Rights and international law.
Courts have often made the point that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel applies only to criminal investigations and tri-
als,129 and, to a limited extent, an initial appeal of a criminal con-
viction. 3 ' The federal government has made use of this limitation
by classifying detainees as not criminal suspects, but rather, as
either "unlawful combatants" (Guantanamo detainees)' or "en-
emy combatants" (American citizens Hamdi and al-Muhajir)"'
Yet, the government has demonstrated that these decisions are a
discretionary sleight-of-hand to avoid the Bill of Rights by pursu-
ing criminal prosecutions against other terrorism suspects,33 in-
cluding the prosecution and conviction of the "American Taliban,"
John Walker Lindh, T' whose alleged misdeeds and circumstances
of being taken into custody in Afghanistan while fighting with the
Taliban are virtually identical to the case of "enemy combatant"
Hamdi. 135 Acts of terrorism against the United States are covered
126. COLE & SMITH, supra note 30, at 320.
127. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 136.
128. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966), Chief Justice Earl Warren's opin-
ion emphasized the importance of access to counsel during questioning: "If the interroga-
tion continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy bur-
den rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed coun-
sel .... " Id.
129. E.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no right to counsel for discretionary ap-
peals of criminal convictions); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no automatic right
to counsel for hearings on probation revocation).
130. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
131. See text and footnotes, supra notes 88-104.
132. See text and footnotes, supra notes 105-25.
133. Purdy & Bergman, supra note 120.
134. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 199.
135. See Turley, supra note 123, at 11A.
Hamdi has been held without charge even though the facts of his case are virtually
identical to those of the case of John Walker Lindh. Both Hamdi and Lindh were
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by criminal statutes, 36 but the government's treatment of detain-
ees as something other than criminal suspects permits the deten-
tion and interrogation of people against whom there is little or no
evidence, as well as allowing avoidance of the limitations imposed
by constitutional rights.
Anthony Lewis, a writer who became famous for his best-selling
book on Gideon v. Wainwright,'37 has harshly criticized the gov-
ernment's denial of counsel for terrorism suspects. His criticism
helps to highlight the gap between current practices and the ideal-
istic intentions of the Bill of Rights:
The government argues, and in the other "enemy combatant"
case [concerning Hamdi] the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit agreed, that the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of the right to counsel "in all criminal prosecutions"
does not apply because Padilla is not being prosecuted. In
other words, the government can hold an American in prison
for life without letting him see a lawyer if it takes care not to
charge him with a crime and try him. James Madison and
the others who added the Sixth Amendment and the rest of
the Bill of Rights to the Constitution in 1791 would surely
have regarded that argument as sophistry.
138
Is representation by counsel essential to prevent errors or abuse
directed at people detained by the government? Do our principles
of government genuinely reflect a belief that adversary processes
provide the best mechanism to discover the truth and protect
against abusive practices by government? 9 Court decisions con-
captured in Afghanistan as foot soldiers in Taliban units. Yet Lindh was given a
lawyer and a trial, while Hamdi rots in a floating Navy brig in Norfolk, Va.
Id.
136. Title 18, section 113B of the United States Code defines terrorism crimes concern-
ing use of weapons of mass destruction, acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries,
harboring or concealing terrorists, and other matters. 18 U.S.C. § 113B (2003).
137. LEWIS, supra note 39.
138. Anthony Lewis, The Silencing of Gideon's Trumpet, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2003,
available at www.nytimes.com/2003/04/20/magazine/20GIDEON.html.
139. See DAViD 0. FRIEDRICHS, LAW IN OUR LIvEs: AN INTRODUCTION 42 (2001).
In the American criminal justice system, the adversarial model is used in major fel-
ony cases. On the plus side, adherents of the adversarial model claim that the truth
in a criminal case is most likely to emerge when each side is best able to put forth its
case. Furthermore, the defendant in a major criminal case, up against the intimidat-
ing resources of the state, has the best chance to put forward a case with the capacity
to introduce evidence and witnesses and to challenge the state's evidence and cross-
examine the state's witnesses.
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cerning criminal suspects over the past forty years supported this
principle, but the current actions by the federal government con-
vey the impression that commitment to this principle is situ-
ational and transitory. If we adopt a pragmatic approach to rep-
resentation for people detained by the government, how far might
our pragmatism spread with respect to rights available for indi-
viduals suspected of other offenses eligible for the label of "terror-
ism"? We have already seen anti-terrorism laws used in an at-
tempt to enhance penalties for common criminals, such as the
methamphetamine defendant in North Carolina who faced a sen-
tence of 12 years to life instead of merely six months in jail be-
cause he was charged with manufacturing a weapon of mass de-
struction for producing illegal drugs.4 ° Moreover, how do we en-
sure that discretionary decisions by government will not be erro-
neous or abusive when determinations are made about whom to
detain and how to treat detainees during their indefinite incom-
municado detention? The principle of the right to counsel was in-
tended to counteract these problems, but the current pragmatic
avoidance of this right enhances the risks of abusive governmental
actions and errors that constitutional rights are intended to pre-
vent.
As Professor Stephen Schulhofer observes, prior to the contem-
porary anti-terrorism practices, "regardless of context (civil,
criminal, immigration, or military) detention incommunicado has
never been permitted for any appreciable time at all.""' When
government officials keep individuals in detention from being ob-
served by others or from communicating with others, then there is
no way to know how they are being treated. Are they being tor-
tured? Are they being fed? Are they even still alive? Only the
government officials can know for sure.
As discussed in the foregoing sections,4 there are widespread
reports that the United States is willing to engage in and facilitate
forms of physical coercion of terrorism suspects that human rights
advocates regard as "[American] complicity in torture.""3 Such
actions clash directly with underlying purposes of the Fifth
140. James Ridgeway, Power Over the People, THE VILLAGE VOICE, July 29, 2003, avail-
able at www.villagevoice.com/issues/0331/mondo3.php.
141. Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No Balances: Discarding Bedrock Constitutional
Principles, in THE WAR ON OuR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 93
(Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003).
142. See text and footnotes, supra notes 96-104.
143. Press, supra note 90, at 22.
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Amendment's prohibition on compelled self-incrimination. Even
one of Miranda's harshest academic critics, Professor Joseph
Grano, concluded unequivocally that "we can convincingly claim
that torture-meaning, for present purposes, physical violence
against defendants to procure confessions or information-violates
fundamental principles of justice that are deeply rooted in the tra-
ditions and conscience of our nation."'" Professor Amar reiterates
this point by noting that "Is]ome leading Framers [of the Bill of
Rights] thought of the self-incrimination clause as a protection
against torture .... Our main concer[n] today should still be pro-
tecting against third-degree tactics .... . 5 There is evidence that
such actions are being applied to detainees abroad and there is no
way to know whether the government is refraining from similar
tactics with the "enemy combatants" detained incommunicado in
military jails within the United States. 14 6 Without contact be-
tween attorneys and detainees, what will provide the check
against the use of torturous methods against terrorism suspects
held within the United States?
B. Right to Probable Cause Determination and Right of Access to
the Courts
As described earlier in this article, the Fourth Amendment re-
quires a judicial determination of probable cause to justify an ar-
rest and detention, 14' and furthermore, detained individuals pos-
sess a right to access to the courts under the Due Process Clause
and various precedents.' 48 These principles, respectively, are obvi-
ously intended to prevent arbitrary, unjustified deprivations of
liberty based on discretionary decisions of government officials
and to remedy such unjustified detentions and vindicate other
144. JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 100 (1993).
145. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 51 (1997).
146. It is known that John Walker Lindh, the so-called "American Taliban" who was
convicted of terrorism-related crimes rather than isolated as an "enemy combatant," was
subjected to physical tactics as part of the treatment associated with his interrogation prior
to his return to the United States:
During this time, Lindh was sometimes kept blindfolded, naked, and bound to a
stretcher with duct tape, according to a declassified account from a Navy physician.
He was fed only a thousand calories a day, and was left cold and sleep-deprived in a
pitch-dark steel shipping container. The physician described Lindh as "disoriented"
and "suffering lack of nourishment," adding that "suicide is a concern."
Jane Mayer, Lost in Jihad, THE NEW YORKER, March 10, 2003, at 57.
147. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
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rights. Because the "unlawful combatants" in Cuba and the
American citizen "enemy combatants" are being held incommuni-
cado based on unsubstantiated declarations of suspicion by gov-
ernment officials, neither of these principles provide benefits for
the detainees.
Outsiders have attempted to gain access to the courts on behalf
of both sets of detainees, but, for several reasons,'49 they have been
unsuccessful in gaining judicial protection of rights. Relatives and
supporters of the "unlawful combatants" detained in Cuba have
been unsuccessful in gaining judicial scrutiny and protection of
rights for detainees because of issues of standing as well as World
War II-era precedents rejecting constitutional protections for for-
eigners held in American custody overseas."' Issues of American
courts' jurisdiction seem inevitable whenever cases concern people
and events that are overseas, but in this instance, the U.S. Navy
base has for 100 years been entirely under the control of the
United States and is governed entirely by American laws."' Thus,
the outside-an-American-jurisdiction argument, like the labels
used for the detainees, appears to resort to the application of ques-
tionable categories or labels as a means to avoid application of the
Bill of Rights and other potentially applicable treaties and laws.
Hamdi's father and other supporters have thus far been unsuc-
cessful in gaining access to the courts for substantive examination
of Hamdi's rights claims due to judicial deference to the presi-
dent's war powers as commander in chief.5 2 Al-Muhajir, through
litigation filed by his attorney and supporters, has gained favor-
able district court rulings about his right to meet with his attor-
ney, but the government has resisted implementing these rulings
149. E.g., Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 450.
150. Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C. D. Cal. 2003).
151. The United States assumed control of Guantanamo Bay through a lease agreement
in 1903 that was later confirmed by the Treaty of 1934. The United States effectively has a
perpetual lease. As described in a detailed history of Guantanamo Bay on the website of
the U.S. Navy Base located there:
[Tihus, it is clear that at Guantanamo Bay, we have a Naval reservation which, for
all practical purposes, is American territory. Under the foregoing agreements, the
United States has for approximately fifty years exercised the essential elements of
sovereignty over the territory, without actually owning it .... Persons on the reser-
vation are amenable only to United States legislative enactments.
THE HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY (Vol. I), 1494-1964 (Online edition), at Ch. 3, available
at www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/gazette/History-98-64/hischp3.htm.
152. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d
278 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
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and sought interlocutory appeals to challenge the conclusions of
the district judge.
153
There is a provision in the Constitution that creates the possi-
bility of presidential decisions that deny access to the courts dur-
ing times of national emergency: the Habeas Corpus Suspension
Clause." The Clause says, "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it." 55 As indicated by
the founders' decision to mention and protect the opportunity for
individuals to petition the courts to remedy unlawful detentions
(except in times of emergencies), the Americans drew from Eng-
lish antecedents to emphasize the importance of this avenue for
judicial protection of individuals.'56 Yet, there is precedent for the
suspension of the writ in the United States. Presidents Lincoln
and Grant imposed suspension in certain geographic areas during
the Civil War and Reconstruction, although the later suspensions
came pursuant to authorizing acts of Congress rather than solely
by executive fiat.17 There were also limited, temporary suspen-
sions in the Philippines related to the Spanish-American War's
aftermath and in Hawaii during World War II. " It is notable,
however, that President George W. Bush has not sought to exer-
cise this suspension authority as a means to justify the detentions
without due process or access to the courts. 159 Instead, his admini-
stration has, at least in the case of al- Muhajir, employed specious
manipulations to deny access to courts: the government claimed
that no habeas petition could be filed on al-Muhajir's behalf be-
cause he did not personally sign the petition, but the government
has blocked all access to him by outsiders so that he is physically
prevented from signing the petition.6 ' Unfortunately, such tactics
convey the impression that the government will go to any lengths
153. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F.Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
154. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
155. Id.
156. See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2337 (1993).
Habeas corpus had a long and distinguished history in England before it was im-
ported to the American colonies. The courts at Westminster and Parliament contrib-
uted to its development as the Great Writ of Liberty-the means by which English
courts could enforce the 'law of the land' against governmental power.
Id.
157. Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 977-78 (1998).
158. Id.
159. Schulhofer, supra note 141, at 92-93.
160. Id.
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to manipulate arguments and contexts in order to deny access to
courts and the potential protection of the Bill of Rights.
How does this contemporary practice of detention without ac-
cess to the courts compare to the original constitutional vision of
the nation's founders? It is instructive to look at Alexander Ham-
ilton's words in Federalist No. 84:
The establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibi-
tion of ex-post-facto laws, and of titles of nobility.. .are perhaps
greater securities to liberty and republicanism than any
[other provisions that the Constitution] contains .... [T]he prac-
tice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the fa-
vorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny."'
The treatment of detainees is clearly "deprivation of ... liberty.
without due process of law" in direct contravention of the words
of the Fifth Amendment."' The contemporary practice that treats
access to the courts as a luxury that becomes unavailable to spe-
cific citizens by discretionary decision of government officials pro-
vides a stark contrast with a principled view of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights that regards such access as an essential
shield against arbitrary or unjustified deprivations of liberty.
V. CONCLUSION
The Bill of Rights was unquestionably intended to impose limits
on governmental actions that would harm the autonomy, privacy,
and liberty of individuals within the United States.'63 As Professor
Jack Rakove observes, "The belief that Britons and Americans
enjoyed unparalleled liberty in the exercise of their rights perme-
ated their political science and even popular culture [in the eight-
eenth century] . . . Life, liberty, and property comprised the fun-
damental trinity of inalienable rights . . . ."" These elements are
reflected in the language of the Bill of Rights65 and the Fourteenth
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), available at
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed84.htm (online edition-the Avalon Project at Yale
Law School).
162. U.S. CONST., amend V.
163. DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995 88-105 (Univ. Press of Kansas 1996).
164. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 290 (Alfred A. Knopf 1996).
165. U.S. CONST. amend V.
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Amendment. 166 Over the history of the Supreme Court's interpre-
tations of the Bill of Rights, there have been many disputes about
the meaning and applicability of individual amendments. 6 7 How-
ever, there has been little doubt that their underlying purpose is
to "guarantee a range of personal freedoms," '68 especially with re-
gard to the federal government, against which the rights were
originally directed.'69 Even those who do not interpret those rights
broadly will acknowledge, in the words of Judge Robert Bork, that
"the principles of the Bill of Rights are, by and large, timeless
principles of our free society." 7'
The anti-terrorism tactics of the contemporary federal govern-
ment in holding detainees without the presentation of incriminat-
ing evidence or the protection of law or access to courts clearly
clash with the principles of the Bill of Rights that purport to guard
against unchecked assertions of governmental power that impinge
on individual liberty. These tactics appear to be based on prag-
matic considerations concerning an urgent need to protect na-
tional security rather than a principled interpretation of the Bill of
Rights. In the words of Viet Dinh, an Assistant Attorney General
in the U.S. Justice Department who advises Attorney General
John Ashcroft on legal policy:
I think it is critical that one recognizes that the first function
- even if you are an ardent anarchist you have to recognize -
that the function of government is the security of its polity
and the safety of its people. For without them, there can be
no structure so that liberty can survive. We see our work not
as balancing security and liberty. Rather, we see it as secur-
ing liberty by assuring the conditions for true liberty. 7'
There are precedents for such exercises of governmental power
during times of war, such as the detention of Japanese-Americans
166. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
167. See, e.g., TINSLEY YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION
215-42 (2000) (discussion of Rehnquist Court justices' disagreements about the meaning of
rights affecting criminal justice).
168. Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 9.
169. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 108 (1988).
170. The Advocates, LIFE, Fall 1991, at 98.
171. Lewis, Security and Liberty: Preserving the Values of Freedom, in THE WAR ON OUR
FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 66-67 (Richard C. Leone & Greg
Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003).
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during World War 11,172 an action that scholars have characterized
as "violat[ing] in a flagrant fashion the fundamentals of due proc-
ess of law."'73 However, critics note that governmental crackdowns
during wartime far exceed the nature of demonstrated threat
posed by Japanese-American during World War II and other tar-
geted groups during other eras.'74 According to historian Alan
Brinkley:
Some alteration in our understanding of rights is appropriate
and necessary in dangerous times, as even the most ardent
civil libertarians tend to admit. But the history of civil liber-
ties in times of emergency suggests that governments seldom
react to crises carefully or judiciously. They acquiesce to the
most alarmist proponents of repression.
The contemporary use of detentions without due process raises
numerous important and difficult questions. Is the terrorist
threat posed to the United States by al Qaeda really so severe as
to jeopardize institutional survival and social stability to such an
extent that there may be "no structure so that liberty can survive,"
as described in the Assistant Attorney General's justification for
incommunicado detentions?76  Will the "war on terrorism" that
defines the government's intended length of detentions ever end,
in light of the fact that it is not a war against an identifiable coun-
try but is instead a conflict with shadowy groups and individuals
around the world who may be able to recruit new zealots for years
and years to come? 7 And finally, what will the U.S. Supreme
Court say about the government's tactics that deny the impor-
tance and effect of constitutional rights and law?
Historically, the Supreme Court has generally deferred to ex-
ecutive authority in wartime cases," 8 including the case of the
172. ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARRISON & HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, Vol. II, 544-45 (7th ed. 1991).
173. Id. at 544.
174. Alan Brinkley, A Familiar Story: Lessons From Past Assaults on Freedoms, in THE
WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 23-36 (Richard C.
Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003); see also Robin Toner, Despite Some Concerns, Civil
Liberties Are Taking a Back Seat, N.Y. TIMES, November 18, 2001, available at
www.nytimes.com/2001/11/18/politics/18LIBE.html (description of historical precedents for
reduction of civil liberties during wartime).
175. Brinkley, supra note 174, at 45.
176. See Lewis, Security and Liberty, supra note 171, at 66-67.
177. See Turley, supra note 123.
178. Wasby, supra note 23, at 333-35.
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Japanese-Americans held in detention during World War IIV
Several Rehnquist Court justices have made statements that may
demonstrate an inclination to defer to executive authority during
the current "war on terrorism."18' The Court's initial encounter
with these issues looms ahead because of its agreement to hear a
case concerning the Guantanamo Bay detainees' entitlement to
access to the courts. The Supreme Court will consider the follow-
ing question: "Whether the United States courts lack jurisdiction
to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign
nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and in-
carcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba?" '81 In the
lower courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit affirmed a district court decision'82 that, relying on a
World War II era precedent concerning a habeas corpus claim by
German military personnel in American custody,183 concluded that
U.S. district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus
claims from foreign combatants in American custody overseas."According to the opinion of the Court of Appeals:
[T]he [Guantanamo] detainees are in all relevant respects in
the same position as the [World War II German] prisoners in
Eisentrager. They cannot seek release based on violations of
the Constitution or treaties or federal law; the courts are not
open to them. Whatever other relief the detainees seek, their
claims necessarily rest on alleged violations of the same cate-
gory of laws listed in the habeas corpus statute, and are
therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts.'85
Some observers believe that the Supreme Court accepted the
case, not because of a desire to provide legal protections for de-
tainees, but merely to reject the Bush administration's assertion
that the Supreme Court could not hear the case.' According to
this prediction, the Court will say, with respect to the jurisdic-
tional issue, that it has the authority to choose to hear this case
179. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
180. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 208-09.
181. Rasul v. Bush, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8203 (2003).
182. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002).
183. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
184. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
185. Id. at 1145.
186. Linda Greenhouse, It's A Question of Federal Turf, N.Y. TIMES, November 12, 2003,
available at www.nytimes.com/2003/11/12/national/12SCOT.html.
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debating federal courts' jurisdiction to consider the detainees' enti-
tlement to a right of access to the courts through habeas corpus
proceedings.'87 However, it will likely continue by concluding that
the detainees' are not entitled to have the substance of their
claims heard in the federal courts. 8 '
If the Court actually issues the decision as predicted, it will re-
inforce the pragmatic precedents that have previously rejected
requests to apply constitutional principles to limit actions directed
by American officials toward foreign nationals at overseas loca-
tions. However, the starker issue of American citizens' rights
within their own country will be unaffected by this case. It re-
mains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will defer to the
Bush administration's actions and, in effect, endorse a pragmatic
view of the applicability of the Bill of Rights. The purported prin-
ciples of the Bill of Rights, as reflected in the underlying inten-
tions of the amendments and consensus, or near-consensus, sup-
port by Supreme Court justices and public opinion, are clearly in
conflict with contemporary detentions of American citizens indefi-
nitely and incommunicado, without any presentation of substanti-
ated incriminating evidence,'89 any access to advice of counsel, or
any access to courts for judicial protection of constitutional rights.
Because the government's treatment of the detained American
citizens is unprecedented, the Supreme Court cannot easily wrap
itself in the purported legitimacy of stare decisis if it chooses to
defer to the government. Instead, any decision that fails to pro-
vide access to the courts and a right to counsel, even if it comes
through a Supreme Court decision that denies a writ of certiorari
in these cases,"' will effectively deliver the message that Bill of
Rights' image as the repository of powerful protective principles is
merely illusory. Such a decision may be "regretted by later gen-
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The only evidence presented to a court against al Muhajir, for example, is the so-
called "Mobbs declaration," a brief statement of accusations presented by Michael H.
Mobbs, a Defense Department official. Al Muhajir has never had any opportunity to con-
test the factual assertions in the declaration. Benjamin Weiser, Judge Affirms Terror Sus-
pect Must Meet With Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2003, available at
www.nytimes.com/2003/03/12/national/12DIRT.html.
190. Cases arrive at the U.S. Supreme Court through petitions for a writ of certiorari,
which is the traditional action through which the justices make discretionary decisions
about the small number of cases that they will select for hearing and decision. The justices
are free to decline to hear cases, even when these cases reflect burning controversies that
are hotly debated by the American public. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 207-08, 226-56 (3d ed. 1993).
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erations of Americans, as the World War II detainment of Japa-
nese-Americans ha[s] been."19' Constitutional rights will become
mere luxuries that are unavailable to those segments of the
American population that the executive branch - the officials
whose authority was supposed to be limited and restrained by the
Bill of Rights - deems unworthy of judicial access and legal pro-
tection. Moreover, it may be much more difficult to hold our legal
system out to the world as the exemplar of the protection of rights
and liberties.
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